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I
INTRODUCTION
One of the consequences of the global financial crisis is that advanced
economies, such as the United States and United Kingdom, currently have very
loose monetary policies with very low interest rates. A number of the stronger
economies in the emerging markets—China, India, and Brazil, for example—
have suffered less than many industrial countries. Not surprisingly, therefore,
there has been a tendency for capital to flow to certain emerging markets in
search of higher returns. Emerging-market economies with freely floating (or
close to freely floating) exchange-rate regimes, open capital accounts, and solid
fundamentals, have seen their currency appreciate as a consequence, as Brazil
did in 2009. Clearly, this economic consequence creates a policy challenge for
the affected emerging markets. If the decision is made to allow the currency to
appreciate, exports will become relatively more expensive and imports
relatively less expensive. This policy will have an adverse effect on domestic
employment and will move the current account towards deficit (or into greater
deficit). Such a policy could also make the system vulnerable to a future shock if
the capital inflows were subsequently rapidly reversed.
In this environment, there will be a tendency for those in the affected
emerging markets to consider a range of measures, including implementing
capital controls to slow down or ration the inflow of capital. Clearly, any such
step would run counter to the trend towards liberalization of capital movements
specifically and globalization generally.
The global financial crisis has also brought capital controls back into focus
as a means of responding to a crisis. In the early stages of the current global
financial crisis, foreign investors sought to move capital invested in a range of
emerging-market economies into safe havens, forsaking the higher risk
premium embedded in the higher yield. A number of such economies therefore
faced a rapid outflow of capital. For those with freely floating (or close to freely
floating) exchange-rate regimes and open capital accounts, the result was a
weakening of the exchange rate. The classic policy response would be to
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increase the domestic interest rate and to intervene in the foreign-exchange
market by using reserves to seek to dampen excessive short-run volatility in the
exchange rate. Clearly, significant increases in the domestic interest rate will
reduce domestic investment and make raising new domestic debt more
expensive.
Increasing the domestic interest rate is not a policy well suited as a response
to a looming recession. If the country has, or a large proportion of its residents
have, borrowed in foreign currency, a weakening exchange rate will also
increase the local currency cost of servicing external debt. One of the measures
which will inevitably be considered in this context is the imposition of capital
controls to slow the speed at which capital is removed from the country. It may
be helpful to refer to this tendency as one driven by a desire to respond to a
crisis.
II
WHAT ARE CAPITAL CONTROLS?
Capital controls can take many forms. They range from familiar
arrangements—such as prohibitions, the requirement for prior approval, or
authorization in respect of inward and outward movements of capital—to far
more subtle arrangements under which movements of capital are permitted but
discriminatorily taxed. Taxation of inward investment may be calibrated by
reference to its duration, with longer-term investments taxed at a far lower rate
or not at all. Chile employed such a system through its so-called encaje for many
years to discourage short-term speculative inflows of capital and to encourage
medium- to long-term investment. (This took the form of a mandatory one year,
noninterest-paying, variable deposit with the central bank.)
Exchange controls are a type of capital control that regulates the way the
domestic currency relates to international currency markets. These may include
prohibitions, restrictions (or limits) on the ability to exchange domestic
currency for foreign currency, or multiple currency practices in which differing
exchange rates are used for different purposes. Repatriation requirements,
under which foreign exchange earned through the export of goods or services
need to be sold to the home-country central bank, are also a common feature of
exchange-control regimes.
III
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Economic theory tells us—through the Mundell–Fleming model, or the
“impossible trinity”—that it is impossible to have all three of the following at
the same time:
1. A fixed exchange rate;
2. Free capital movement; and
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3. An independent monetary policy.
As Paul Krugman once put it,

The point is you can’t have it all: A country must pick two out of three. It can fix its
exchange rate without emasculating its central bank, but only by maintaining controls
on capital flows (like China today); it can leave capital movement free but retain
monetary autonomy, but only by letting the exchange rate fluctuate (like Britain—or
Canada); or it can choose to leave capital free and stabilise the currency, but only by
2
abandoning any ability to adjust interest rates to fight inflation or recession.

Restricting capital flows is, perhaps, the most controversial of policy
alternatives that a country may use. The global financial crisis has shown us
that, in extremis, we reside in a world of financial markets prone to herding,
panics, and contagion. In this context, the key rationale for capital controls is
that global financial turbulence can have severely negative effects on a domestic
economy.
Exchange controls used to be the standard response of countries with
balance-of-payments crises. The classic 1970s model required exporters to sell
their foreign-currency earnings to the state at a fixed exchange rate; that
currency would, in turn, be sold at the same rate for approved payments to
foreigners, basically for imports and debt service. Although some countries
tried to make other foreign-exchange transactions illegal, other countries
allowed a parallel market. Creating such a system is burdensome, but with it in
place, there may be more stability. For example, in such a system, a country
needing to cut domestic interest rates would have far less concern that the value
of its currency would plunge.
Exchange controls suffer from manifest problems in practice, most
significantly that they are subject to abuse. Exporters have an incentive to hide
their foreign-exchange receipts; importers have an incentive to pad their
invoices. Exchange controls are distortionary. There is also the problem that
administrative officials may be invited to agree to special arrangements. Most
economists feel that exchange controls work badly, particularly if they are in
place for an extended period.
There is also a significant concern that exchange controls imposed to stem
capital flight arising after a bank run, for example, can replace necessary
domestic reform (for example, increased prudential supervision and higher
capital ratios) rather than effectively buy time for reform to take place.
1. For a discussion on the Mundell–Fleming model, see Maurice Obstfeld, International
Macroeconomics: Beyond the Mundell-Fleming Model 5–8 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Int’l and
Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. C01-121, 2001), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/if/papers/
0303/0303006.pdf. For a discussion on the “impossible trinity” of open-economy macroeconomics, see
PETER MONTEL, MACROECONOMICS IN EMERGING MARKETS 339 (2002); see also John McHale,
Capital Account Convertibility and Capital Controls in Emerging Market Countries: Some Themes from
the First Meeting, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/crisis/capital_report.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2010); Paul Krugman, The Eternal Triangle, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/
triangle.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
2. Paul Krugman, O Canada: Neglected Nation Gets Its Nobel, SLATE (Oct. 19, 1999), http://www
.slate.com/id/36764.
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Exchange controls can therefore shield inaction. Yet Krugman observed that
although exchange controls worked badly in practice, China’s exchange controls
enabled it to ride out the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 rather well
compared to its neighbors:
Because [China] has been able to cut, not raise, interest rates in this crisis, despite
maintaining a fixed exchange rate[,] and the reason it is able to do that is that it has an
inconvertible currency, a.k.a. exchange controls. Those controls are often evaded, and
they are the source of lots of corruption, but they still give China a degree of policy
3
leeway that the rest of Asia desperately wishes it had.

IV
RECONCILING CAPITAL CONTROLS WITH INTERNATIONAL-LAW
OBLIGATIONS
Whether as a result of a desire for crisis prevention or as a crisis-response
measure, the imposition of capital controls also raises a host of internationallaw considerations, including those arising under the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).
A. The IMF Articles of Agreement
The IMF Articles of Agreement recognize exchange control in three
principal provisions, namely Article VI(3), Article VIII(2)(a), and Article XIV.4
1. Article VI(3)
Under Article VI(3), member states have discretion to “exercise such
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.”5 Sir
Joseph Gold, former General Counsel of the IMF, explains that Article VI(3)
was necessary “because of the destabilising effects that flows of ‘hot money’ had
in the period before the IMF came into existence.”6 The global financial crisis
has made those words, written well over twenty years ago, resonant. Member
states can exercise Article VI(3) discretion without the approval of the IMF.
Importantly, though, no regulation implemented under Article VI(3) may
restrict payments for current transactions or unduly delay transfers of funds in
settlement of commitments. In the context of financial crises, Article VI(3) can
be used by a country to slow down capital flight by limiting the ability of

3. Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical: The IMF Plan Not Only Has Failed to
Revive Asia’s Troubled Economies But Has Worsened the Situation. It’s Now Time for Some Painful
Medicine, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1998, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_
archive/1998/09/07/247884/index.htm.
4. Joseph Gold, “Exchange Contracts,” Exchange Control, and the IMF Articles of Agreement:
Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 33 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 777, 778–79
(1984).
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund Art. VI(3), July 22, 1944, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
6. Gold, supra note 4, at 778.
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residents to export capital, subject to its other treaty obligations, most
particularly under bilateral investment treaties.
2. Article VIII(2)(a)
Article VIII(2)(a) provides the IMF with jurisdiction over restrictions
imposed by member states on making payments and transfers for current
international transactions. In accepting the obligations of Article VIII’s sections
2(a), 3, and 4, members of the IMF agree to not impose restrictions on making
payments and transfers for current international transactions and not engage in
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency arrangements,
except with IMF approval. IMF approval is required so that restrictions on
payments and transfers for current international transactions are not deemed
breaches of the treaty. Gold explains that “the IMF’s practice is to grant
approval, when justifiable, for a limited period only because the restrictions are
derogations.”7 So far as the limited time period is concerned, exchange
measures taken for national or international security reasons are approached
differently. These often take the form of financial sanctions and restrictions to
combat the financing of terrorism and will often therefore restrict the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions. Here, in practice,
after notification, IMF approval is granted indefinitely.
3. Article XIV
Article XIV deals with transitional arrangements. A member state may take
advantage of the transitional arrangements to maintain (and adapt) existing
exchange controls that would otherwise be in breach of Article VIII(2)(a) while
taking all possible measures, as soon as conditions permit, “to develop such
commercial and financial arrangements with other members as will facilitate
international payments.”8
Once withdrawn, the transitional arrangements may not be implemented
again by the member state without the approval of the IMF under Article
VIII(2)(a).9 According to the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2009, nineteen countries continue to
avail themselves of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV.
4. Other IMF Articles
Article IV(3)(b) imposes upon the IMF the duty to “exercise firm
surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members.”10 Gold concludes that
[the] provisions demonstrate that the international interest is served, first, by allowing
members to decide whether or not to control capital movements, and second by
requiring the IMF to exercise tight invigilation over restrictions on payments and
transfers for current international transactions. The approval of the IMF is necessary

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 779.
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 5, Art. XIV(2).
Id. Art. XIV(1).
Id. Art. IV(3)(b); Gold, supra note 4, at 780.
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for such restrictions, unless they are authorised by the transitional arrangements, to
11
which, however a member cannot revert for the reintroduction of restrictions.

Article VIII(2)(b) is also particularly important for the functioning and
enforcement of member agreements:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary
to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the
purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective,
12
provided that such measures and regulations are consistent with this Agreement.

In other words, if one member country has a set of exchange-control
regulations that satisfy the requirements of Article VI(3), Article VIII(2)(a)
(which requires IMF approval), or that is a transitional arrangement under
Article XIV, then any exchange contract that breaches those exchange-control
regulations is unenforceable in the courts of other IMF member countries. This
is clearly powerful, but the scope of the application of Article VIII(2)(b) has
been limited in practice by the interpretation of the meaning of exchange
contracts, over which two lines of interpretation have emerged: the “narrow
construction” and the “wide construction.” These approaches have different
consequences for the effective scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction seized by a
court and are worthy of further description.
The English, American, and Belgian courts have all adopted the narrow
construction that exchange contracts exchange the currency of one state for the
currency of another state, either as their primary object or when the contract is
a monetary transaction in disguise.13 A typical example in today’s marketplace
would include spot and forward foreign-exchange contracts including, most
likely, derivative equivalents, such as nondeliverable forwards.
The French and Luxembourgian courts have preferred the wide
construction that an exchange contract is any contract that affects the exchange
resources of a state. In addition to contracts whose objective is an exchange of
currency (or are such contracts in disguise), this interpretation includes
contracts that require a party to sell domestic currency to purchase a foreign
currency as part of its contractual obligations.14 An example of this type of

11. Gold, supra note 4, at 781.
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 5, Art. VIII(2)(b)
(emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1120 (5th Cir. 1985); Libra Bank, Ltd. v.
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weston Bank Corp. v. Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–99 (N.Y. 1982); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank,
Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 174 (N.Y. 1975); Banco de Brassil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 190 N.E.2d
235, 236 (N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Emek v. Bossers and Mouthaan, 22 I.L.R. 722
(1955); Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Teruzzi, (1976) 1 Q.B. 683; United City Merchs. Ltd. v. Royal
Bank of Can., [1983] 1 A.C. 168 (1982) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.); Mansouri v. Singh, (1986) 1
W.L.R. 139.
14. See, e.g., Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725 (1955); de Boer, Widow Moojen v. Von Reichert,
Judgment of June 20, 1961, Cour d’appel, Paris (1st Chamber), 89 J. DROIT INT’L 718; Société Filature
et Tissage X. Jourdain v. Epous Heynen-Bintner, 22 I.L.R. 727 (1955).
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contract would be a dollar-denominated loan made to France requiring the
borrower to use euros to buy the dollars needed to repay the lender.
Article VIII(2)(b) restricts the exercise of sovereignty by an IMF member
state through its courts’ choosing not to enforce the contractual rights of
individuals when the court would otherwise take jurisdiction. Such abstentions
should not be made lightly, for they promote the rules of another legal order
above the rules of that legal order giving the court its legitimacy, and they
interfere with the contractual rights of individuals. Notably, courts that provide
governing law to many international finance contracts, namely England and
New York, are among those least prepared to interfere with contractual rights
without a high degree of certainty that the contract falls within the meaning of
exchange contracts in Article VIII(2)(b). In practice, the narrow construction
can provide efficacy to the international financial system in those jurisdictions
where it prevails. It is also interesting to note that in 1993 and 1994, the German
Supreme Court held in three decisions that international-capital transfers, such
as loan agreements, are not governed by Article VIII(2)(b). Before these
decisions, Germany was thought to be a jurisdiction that preferred the wide
construction of exchange contracts.
It is conceivable that the second sentence of Article VIII(2)(b) could be
cited as support for the narrow construction. Though the first sentence renders
exchange contracts unenforceable in other member states without requiring any
positive step by the third state (surely an indication that Article VIII(2)(b) is
intended to provide an international legal basis for emergency actions), the
second sentence envisages further agreements between members “for the
purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member more
effective.”15 If a situation justifying exchange controls approved by the IMF has
standing acceptance as justifying extraterritorial jurisdiction, the second
sentence suggests that this would be an extraordinary interference in the
sovereignty of other member states and should be moved, by further bilateral
agreement, to a more sustainable basis acceptable to the third state. Providing
for this further step after imposing qualifying exchange controls recognizes that
the power is extraordinary, suggesting that, as such, it should be construed
restrictively.
The wide construction significantly increases the types of contracts included
in the definition of exchange contracts. Adopting the wide construction would
result in the courts of the forum declining jurisdiction more often, for the
extraterritorial jurisdiction permitted by Article VIII(2)(b) applies to a greater
range of types of contract.
Despite the provisions allowing for exchange controls in the IMF Articles,
the use of all forms of capital controls is inconsistent with the movement
towards a globalized financial system. Many took the view that the IMF Articles
effectively reflected the world after the Second World War, in which a majority

15. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 5, Art. VIII(2)(b).
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of countries retained important restrictions over capital transactions. By the
1990s, several countries sought to use the IMF Articles to promote capitalaccount liberalization by amending the IMF Articles to make the liberalization
of capital movements one of the purposes of the Fund. The movement, at one
point, had significant support but was, in reality, put to the side as a result of the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998.
Interestingly, the Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and
Inclusive Development, prepared by the U.K. Commission on Growth and
Development, observed, in relation to capital-account liberalization, that the
link between open capital accounts and high-growth countries was questionable
and that “policies that actively discourage speculative, short-term capital
inflows have proven useful in turbulent times.”16 Many policymakers in the
emerging markets would agree with that assessment.
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
Although the IMF Articles of Agreement have not been amended to make
capital-account liberalization one of its purposes, the incorporation of freetransfer clauses in international legal agreements, such as BITs, has, in practice,
accelerated the movement towards full capital-account liberalization and
convertibility. Free-transfer clauses in investment treaties between countries
seek to ensure the right to freely repatriate assets at all times, and arguably,
unimpeded transferability is an essential ingredient in the proper operation of
investments. Perhaps unable to achieve a blanket free transfer of capital assets
at the multilateral level, important multilateral agreements have tended to
liberalize capital-account transactions. However, in general, Michael Waibel has
observed in an illuminating work that liberalization has been embedded in a
carefully designed system of safeguards in case balance-of-payments crises
arise.17 The North America Free Trade Agreement, the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs, the World Trade Organization, and the General Agreement
on Trade in Services generally ensure that host countries retain the flexibility to
impose exchange restrictions consistent with the IMF Articles of Agreement.18
For dealings between two countries, governments often use their model BITs;
here, free-transfer clauses can have their strongest effect. The French and U.S.
model BITs illustrate the differences in types of free-transfer clauses.19 For
example, the French Model BIT (2005) contains a funds-transfer clause. But it
also contains a balance-of-payments safeguard clause and does not guarantee
free convertibility at market exchange rates. The wording provides that the free

16. The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, COMM’N ON
GROWTH AND DEV. (June 2008), http://cgd.s3.amazonaws.com/GrowthReportComplete.pdf.
17. Michael Waibel, Bit by Bit: The Silent Liberalization of the Capital Account, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 506 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
18. Id. at 506–08.
19. Id. at 514–15.
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transfer of a number of items (for example, interest, dividends, profits, etc.) is
guaranteed, but it then specifies:
[w]hen, in exceptional circumstances, capital movements from or to third countries
cause or threaten to cause a serious disequilibrium to its balance-of-payments, each
Contracting Party may temporarily apply safeguard measures to the transfers,
provided that these measures shall be strictly necessary, would be imposed in an
equitable, non-discriminatory and in good faith basis and shall not exceed in any case
20
a six months period.

This language broadly aligns the French position with the IMF Articles of
Agreement.
Unlike the French Model, the U.S. Model BIT (1994) incorporates a fundtransfer provision but applies a broad scope of covered transfers, refers to using
a market exchange rate and not an official exchange rate, and expects transfers
to be made “freely and without delay.”21 Perhaps the most interesting feature
here is the noticeable absence of any safeguards relating to balance-ofpayments crises.
Waibel notes that the Russian Model BIT (1992) goes even farther than the
French Model, subjecting all transfers to compliance with the host state’s
currency legislation.22 This is perhaps consistent with Russia’s history of using
exchange-control legislation.
Countries rarely negotiate BITs during a financial crisis. If they did, it would
be evident that, from a domestic-policy perspective, unqualified free-transfer
clauses in BITs are potentially problematic, and balance-of-payments
safeguards can provide useful flexibility in extreme conditions.
V
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS CRAFTED AROUND EXCHANGE
CONTROLS
How have exchange controls been used as a response to a financial crisis?
Many countries that went through sovereign debt restructurings in the 1980s
had systems of exchange controls in place, for this model had been the norm in
developed countries at the beginning of the 1970s. The typical response to
exchange control in sovereign debt restructurings in the 1980s was in some way
to include the central bank (or other entity holding the country’s reserves or
that was responsible for exchange-control regulations) in the restructuring.
From the creditors’ perspective, the ideal position was to have the state and the
central bank as joint-and-several obligors in the restructuring. There were a few
instances of this approach, including, for example, Poland in 1981, 1983, and
1988. But a more-common formulation was to ensure that the central bank
provided a foreign-exchange-availability undertaking, under which, so long as
the state provided the requisite local currency, foreign exchange would be made
20. Id. at 514.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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available at the prevailing rate to service the relevant external debt—effectively
a covenant to ensure free convertibility into the relevant external debt.
But in two cases, the restructurings were crafted around exchange-control
regulations: South Africa in 1985 through 1994 and Russia in 1998. In the latter
half of 1985, apartheid South Africa encountered a debt crisis that forced the
government to declare a temporary moratorium on all short-term debt
repayments. By the time the moratorium was in place, South Africa had been
affected by years of capital flight out of the country in the form of debt
repayments, royalties, interest and dividend payments, and unrecorded or illicit
flows.23 For the South African government, this severe balance-of-payments
crisis led it to restructure the country’s foreign private debt through an
innovative set of policies achieved through exchange-control regulations.
In the early 1980s, a worsening capital-account deficit forced the South
African government to restrict imports and currency flows so that an adequate
current account surplus might allow the repayment of loans.24 By 1984, foreign
debt had reached a peak of $24.3 billion, which, in South African rands, was
45.7 percent of GDP (reflecting, in part, the decline of the rand against the
dollar). In 1985, though the dollar value of South Africa’s debt declined slightly,
the continuing depreciation of the rand took the debt up to fifty percent of
GDP (at about the time South Africa stopped payment on short-term debts).25
Although South Africa’s total level of debt was not unmanageable in normal
circumstances, and although the country’s current account was in substantial
and growing surplus, the country faced an acute liquidity crisis. It was not in a
position to meet the probable volume of further capital outflow.26 Short-term
debt had reached over seventy percent of South Africa’s total foreign debt. By
August 27, 1985, the rand was at an all-time low of thirty-three cents. With
numerous foreign companies repatriating as much as they could of past
undistributed profits, and thus worsening the flight of capital, South Africa’s
liquidity crisis, long recognized by the apartheid regime, forced the government
to intervene.27
The South African government’s immediate response to the debt crisis was
to impose a four-month debt moratorium (subject to a few exceptions)
prohibiting the repayment of any foreign indebtedness incurred by South
African residents before August 28, 1985. The moratorium was extended twice
in 1986. With foreign debt captive, something had to be done about
rescheduling the debt that South African debtors owed to the foreign creditors.

23. Alan Hirsch, The Origins and Implications of South Africa’s Continuing Financial Crisis, 9
TRANSFORMATION 31, 31 (1989).
24. Id. at 37.
25. Id.
26. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP OF OFFICIALS, BANKING
ON APARTHEID: THE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS REPORT 49 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989).
27. KEITH OVERDEN & TONY COLE, APARTHEID AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: A PROGRAM
FOR CHANGE 84 (1989).
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The overwhelming majority of the debt claims were in the form of foreigncurrency-denominated loans governed by foreign law.
The South African government’s plan in the March 1986 Interim
Arrangement covered the debt with maturity dates falling in the period from
April 1, 1986, to June 30, 1987. The second Interim Arrangement was presented
to creditors as an extension of the 1986 arrangement, covering the debt with
maturity dates falling in the period from July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1990. The third
Interim Arrangement covered the period from July 1, 1990, to December 31,
1993. The final arrangement dealt with the period from 1994 to 2001.
The South African government had to control the amount of capital leaving
the country, even if it required unwelcome interference in many private-sector
contracts. Broadly, the government permitted interest to be paid, but termed
out principal payments owed by South African debtors to foreign creditors. The
solution was achieved through domestic-exchange-control legislation which
limited payments to foreign creditors. The legal techniques utilized a
straightforward offer-and-acceptance mechanism of the Interim Arrangement
Letter, which the foreign creditor could choose to accept. If the foreign creditor
did not accept the offer, it was paid on the terms permitted by the Interim
Arrangement Letter. These arrangements also included features under which
private-sector debt could be converted into South African state debt if the local
debtor and its foreign creditor so wished, and if the local debtor effectively paid
the local-currency equivalent of the relevant claim to a public body established
in part for this purpose. A number of the restrictions affected current
international transactions, but South Africa did not seek IMF approval for its
exchange controls.
Russia’s August 1998 moratorium arose as a result of economic, rather than
political, factors. Russia had been financing a budget deficit through the
issuance of GKOs (Gosudarstvennoye Kratkosrochnoye Obyazatyelstvo,
meaning Government Short-Term Commitments) and other Russian-law
governed instruments. GKOs were ruble denominated; other instruments, such
as so-called Min Fins, were dollar denominated. The yield on GKOs became
very attractive. The GKO market was open only to domestic banks and foreign
banks licensed in Russia, but a thriving market in credit-linked notes developed,
under which foreign banks combined a ruble–dollar swap with the GKOs and
sold a dollar-based return linked to GKOs to European and U.S. investors. The
swap component typically took the form of an English–law-governed forward
contract with one or more Russian banks, under which the ruble flows on the
GKOs could be converted into dollars at a fixed rate. The forward contract
often took the form of a nondeliverable forward, under which dollar payments
were made by reference to movements in the spot dollar-to-ruble rate. This
arrangement avoided the need for physical delivery of rubles, which could be
problematic for a non-Russian bank because of convertibility concerns.
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On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its GKO payments and, through an
exchange-control law, prohibited payments under a number of contracts,
including the swap transactions.
Again, although a number of the restrictions affected current international
transactions, IMF approval under Article VIII(2)(a) was not sought. In Russia’s
case, because the only contracts involved that were governed by foreign law
were swaps, these contracts would have been qualifying exchange contracts
even within the narrow interpretation. This would probably have dampened
litigation if the IMF had approved the applicable exchange-control
arrangements.
Moving forward ten years, the global financial crisis, marked spectacularly
by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, has had, for the reasons
mentioned earlier, a profound impact in certain segments of the sovereign
marketplace. Two other countries that needed to deal with defaults have
resorted to the use of exchange controls, namely Iceland and Ukraine.
VI
ICELAND 2008
On November 25, 2008, the IMF approved a standby arrangement for
Iceland following the collapse of the Icelandic banking system and the on-shore
foreign-exchange market.28 As part of its response to the crisis, on October 10,
2008, the Icelandic government imposed exchange restrictions on certain
current international transactions.29 As a member of the IMF, to whom the
transitional provisions of Article XIV did not apply, Iceland sought IMF
approval of its capital controls, which would bring the exchange restrictions
within Article VIII(2)(a). In practice, once approved by the IMF, exchange
restrictions maintained in accordance with the Articles, and to the extent they
apply to qualifying exchange contracts, are presumed to have extraterritorial
effect under Article VIII(2)(b). Accordingly, Iceland requested “temporary
Fund approval of the exchange restrictions in line with Fund policy, on the basis
that they have been imposed for balance of payments reasons and are nondiscriminatory.”30 Iceland undertook “not to impose or intensify restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions nor
to introduce multiple currency practices.”31 The IMF approved the exchangecontrol regime and noted Iceland’s above undertakings. The IMF’s approval of

28. INT’L MONETARY FUND, ICELAND: REQUEST FOR STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, IMF
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 08/362, at 78 (Nov. 2008), available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/
cr08362.pdf (last visited July 19, 2010).
29. Letter of Intent and Technical Memorandum of Understanding from Davíd Oddsson,
Chairman of the Cent. Bank, and Árni M. Mathiesen, Minister of Fr., to Dominique Strauss-Kahn,
Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund (Nov. 15, 2008) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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the Icelandic exchange restrictions thus gave extraterritorial jurisdiction to the
Icelandic government to render qualifying exchange contracts unenforceable.
The result of extraterritorial effect granted under Article VIII(2)(b) is that
courts that adopt the narrow construction would find, in relation to instruments
governed by their law, for instance, that forward– and spot–foreign-exchange
contracts may not be enforced, but a dollar-loan agreement may be. In courts
that adopt the wide construction, none of these types of contracts may be
enforced.32
It is interesting that the IMF approved Iceland’s exchange controls (albeit
on a temporary basis). Clearly, the circumstances prevailing in Iceland were
exceptional. Given other events at that time, giving primacy to financial stability
over other considerations also would have been understandable. Among the
key factors in the Icelandic crisis were
1. an extraordinary set of numbers relating to gross public-sector debt,
the ratio of affected assets to GDP, external indebtedness, and
depreciation of the currency (in a nutshell, a genuine crisis that
extended to the overwhelming majority of the domestic banking
industry);
2. a number of actual steps and other serious attempts at self-help by
the local administration;
3. a credible government likely to be proactive in trying to improve
the situation; and
4. a transparent system of foreign exchange during the lifetime of the
restrictions assembled on a nondiscriminatory basis.
These criteria suggested a demanding threshold for IMF approval. Compare
these with the exchange controls imposed by the Ukraine—also in 2008—which
were not approved by the IMF.
VII
UKRAINE 2008
Ukraine “imposed a number of exchange controls, including delays on
transferability of hryvnia33 profits, limitations on early repayments of foreign

32. In many respects, in recent years, the distinctions between state debt and private-sector debt
have become blurred. Since the onset of the global financial crisis, many private-sector debt claims have
been supported in some form by their host state. Exchange controls generally affect specified categories
of claims, whether the obligors under them are in the private or public sector, and they therefore
represent another area of state involvement affecting private-sector claims. For example, in the case of
Russia in 1998, swap claims owed in some instances by strong domestic banks (for example, Sberbank)
were caught by the restrictions. In South Africa’s case in 1985, obligations owed by well-capitalized,
profitable companies with strong balance sheets were also caught within the net, all as a result of
conduct by the host state.
33. Hryvnia is the national currency of Ukraine.
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exchange loans, and limitations on advance payments.”34 The restriction on
advance payments was removed before the Letter of Intent was sent to the
IMF, and Ukraine said it would seek IMF approval for the exchange restrictions
at the time of the first review of the Stand-By Arrangement, presumably
because it was acknowledged that the exchange restrictions affected current
international transactions. The IMF commented that “[e]xchange controls . . .
could only . . . be a temporary solution [at most], given circumvention and
distortionary impacts, and could magnify pressure for outflows.”35 During the
first review, the IMF simply noted that “Ukraine [had] accepted the obligations
of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement”36 and
did not approve the exchange restrictions.
The lack of approval from the IMF meant that the obligation of member
states to give extraterritorial effect to the Ukrainian exchange restrictions (to
the extent they applied to qualifying exchange contracts) was not triggered.
This meant that either the exchange-control measures were regarded as being
inherently inconsistent with the IMF Articles or the circumstances surrounding
the imposition of the Ukrainian exchange controls were not appropriate to
justify the interference with either sovereignty or contractual rights that would
be a consequence of approval.
Notably, Ukraine had undertaken no equivalent self-help measures, as was
done by the Icelandic authorities. In its report, the IMF referred to new
exchange restrictions imposed by Ukraine between September 1998 and March
1999, after Ukraine had accepted the obligations under Article VIII.37 This can
be contrasted to the Icelandic undertaking not to intensify restrictions and to
Iceland’s offer to consult with the major affected institutions, either historically
or in 1998. Nor did Ukraine attempt to make the point—which was so
persuasive for Iceland—that the exchange restrictions were imposed for
balance-of-payments reasons and were nondiscriminatory.
It would be fair to conclude that the IMF has recently set a high standard for
approving exchange restrictions affecting current international transactions.
The backdrop of an economy suffering major strains itself is unlikely to be
sufficient. It is helpful if the exchange restrictions themselves are for a specific
purpose and are nondiscriminatory and administered in a transparent manner.
Finally, evidence of self-help by the authorities beyond exchange controls—

34. Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Econ. and Fin. Policies, and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding from Viktor Pynzenyk, Minister of Fin., et al. to Dominiuqe Strauss-Kahn, Managing
Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund (Oct. 31, 2008) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
35. INT’L MONETARY FUND, UKRAINE: REQUEST FOR STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, IMF
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 08/384, at 14 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2008/cr08384.pdf (last visited July 19, 2010).
36. INT’L MONETARY FUND, UKRAINE: FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT,
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 09/173 para. VII (May 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09173.pdf (last visited July 19, 2010).
37. Id.
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perhaps to a level where it would be difficult to expect the state actor to take
any other or further steps—is clearly helpful.
The thresholds for IMF approval cannot be determined from examining just
two examples, but useful conclusions can be drawn about the preparedness of
the IMF under Article VIII(2)(a) to approve exchange restrictions affecting
current international transactions. In Iceland, at the time of this writing, the
rescheduling of state-to-state claims owed to the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands as a result of the Icesave collapse (and the compensation paid by
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to depositors from their respective
jurisdictions) has been halted because Iceland’s president has not approved the
relevant local law. In Ukraine’s case, the external debt restructuring of
Naftogaz (the country’s largest company, also wholly owned by the state) closed
successfully in 2009, with full participation amongst its creditors.
VIII
DEBTOR CONDUCT
Exchange controls used in a manner that is consistent with the IMF Articles
could have a useful role in sovereign debt restructurings. There would be limits
on their application; for instance, a rescheduling of principal claims with interest
remaining current would be easier to reconcile with the IMF Articles than a
stock reduction with extensive interest write-off. Whatever the position, though,
the more important factor in achieving a successful sovereign debt restructuring
is the conduct of the debtor. In this context, collective-action clauses can be
very useful, as Ukraine’s 2009 Naftogaz restructuring and the Republic of
Seychelles 2009–2010 restructuring both demonstrate. In both cases, the
collective-action provisions were activated so that the countries achieved onehundred percent take-up in their restructurings.
IX
CONCLUSION
In extreme conditions, capital controls, including exchange controls
affecting current transactions, potentially have a role to play as a policy
response. In these conditions, particularly when primacy needs to be given to
financial stability, we should expect the IMF, in very limited circumstances, to
consider approving nondiscriminatory exchange controls affecting current
international transactions on a temporary basis.
Although the circumstances in which the use of exchange controls as a crisisresponse tool are likely to be fairly limited, it is not helpful for countries to
further restrict their freedom of movement through free-transfer clauses
without balance-of-payments safeguards in bilateral investment treaties, as that
would have an impact on both crisis-response and crisis-prevention flexibility.

